Udaya Pal
The fall of the brutal Assad regime on the 8th of December was rightly celebrated across the world, just as the horrors of the regime became painfully clear. However, as the dust settles, serious concerns are emerging amongst observers who fear that Syria could follow Libya’s post-revolution trajectory into collapse. Further doubts about the future of Syria’s leadership have been cast by those who highlight the former al-Qaeda connections of the leaders of the rebel coalition, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In this decisive moment, the question arises – how can Syria begin to recover from 60 years of ruthless oppression and 14 years of devastating civil war?
The path to economic recovery
The Syrian economy has crumbled under the Assad regime. The Syrian pound’s value has been drained, and inflation has reached triple digits. Foreign currency reserves were estimated at $10 billion, but today are estimated to stand at around $200 million. 70% of Syrians are living in poverty, with 1 in 4 Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. The UN reports that over 16.7 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian support. Aid funding for those in need of food and access to water will undoubtedly have to be the first priority for the new government.
Years of devastating regime and Russian bombing campaigns have destroyed Syria’s physical infrastructure. Roads have been destroyed, and the power grids and water pipelines have been critically damaged. The estimated reconstruction costs are estimated to be between $250 billion to $450 billion.
Rebuilding the economy in the long term will be an incredibly challenging task. Wheat and fuel exports were the backbone of the Assad economy before the outbreak of the war, but the regime’s scorched earth tactics and destruction of critical infrastructure destroyed all output. Losses in the previously crucial oil sector are estimated to have amounted to around $91.5 billion between 2011 and 2021. Assad’s long string of human rights abuses led to crippling international sanctions, which drained business activity and therefore any tax revenue. The regime’s largest export and main revenue stream became illegal amphetamines, transforming Syria into one of the world’s largest narco-states.
Attempting to revive domestic drivers of growth, like agriculture and small-scale manufacturing, may bring some stability. Unfortunately, the lack of critical physical infrastructure for water and power supply, as well as farmland itself, poses a significant challenge. Additionally, the majority of Syria’s oil and gas fields, along with 60% of its wheat production, are located in the east, which is currently controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Given the potential size of the hydrocarbon sector, the transfer of these resources back to the new government will be a critical step towards financing the gargantuan reconstruction efforts.
Regardless, given the small size of Syria’s economy, long term growth and development won’t be possible without access to foreign capital and technology. The new leadership has begun to implement liberalisation reforms, but real progress requires the removal of international sanctions.
In recent days, EU foreign ministers have agreed to begin easing sanctions to allow the flow of humanitarian aid. This easing of sanctions is conditional on commitments for an inclusive transition, signalling their cautious stance towards HTS. The Biden administration eased similar restrictions to allow the flow of aid, but have not yet formally lifted any sanctions. However, attempts to suspend USAID under Trump have thrown uncertainty over the prospect of further cooperation.
HTS has been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US since 2004, which further complicates the process of relaxing sanctions. However, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (otherwise known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Joulani) has been persistent in his attempts to distance the group from al-Qaeda, and demonstrate that they are a moderate group who only strive for the removal of Assad. Their evolving stances, such as their recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, show a desire to be embraced by the international community.
The Biden administration lifted the $10 million bounty on his head, possibly suggesting recognition of al-Sharaa’s efforts to present a more moderate image. Past US policy on similar groups such as FARC in Colombia show that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible, if the group demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace. HTS have been attempting to show this, as well as a dedication to preventing more extremist actors from trying to capitalise on this situation to seize power. Recent backchannel intelligence sharing between HTS and the US in the fight against IS also suggests that the US may be warming to the idea of a new strategic partner in Syria. HTS could also serve as a valuable asset in U.S. strategic efforts against Hezbollah and the Iranian-backed militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
Nonetheless, the caretaker government’s ambitions for Syrian participation in the global economy are still shackled by US sanctions. Cooperation under Biden is an encouraging sign, but must continue under Trump to ensure Syria can emerge from the economic ruin left behind by the ousted regime.
Securing lasting stability
Following the outbreak of the civil war, Syria became a hotbed of instability with a complex array of armed factions competing for conflicting ambitions. The rebel coalition may have secured control of the capital, but the transitional government now faces the challenge of balancing these lingering interests to prevent descent into further conflict.
Northeastern Syria still remains largely in control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of small militias that serve as the unofficial military force for the de facto autonomous region of Rojava in northeastern Syria. The SDF were created with strong US support, and have been their main partner in the fight against IS. The force is led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Their PKK affiliation has drawn strong opposition from Turkey, leading to years of conflict between the two sides.
The SDF are the only armed faction not to surrender their weapons to the new Syrian defence ministry. The SDF aren’t pushing for an independent Kurdish region in Syria, but have proposed that they be allowed to form their own autonomous Kurdish military bloc. This has been explicitly rejected by Damascus, who have instead pledged to integrate individual members or units of the SDF into the new Syrian army based on merit. Al-Sharaa has been outspoken about his desire to find a middle ground with the SDF, and has expressed willingness to accommodate Kurdish self-administration institutions by restructuring them to align with other government bodies. He has also been very vocal about his commitment to ensuring the return of displaced Kurdish and other minority residents, especially in Afrin, while addressing historical injustices by pushing for full citizenship rights for Kurds.
Negotiations between the two sides have slowed in recent days. Damascus demanded the removal of non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syrian territory, but the PKK has tied their withdrawal to guarantees of SDF control over the east. In response, Turkey has escalated action against the YPG with airstrikes over recent weeks. Rising Turkish-Kurdish tensions create the risk of serious regional fragmentation that could drag the nation back into crisis.
Turkey also provides backing to many factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), who played a major role in the rebel coalition forces. They are an umbrella of several armed factions in northern Syria, who have often clashed with each other, but all share the same opposition to the Assad regime. Many factions of the SNA have taken part in Turkish military operations against the YPG in northern Syria. SNA fighters have also been accused of serious human rights abuses against Kurdish communities in Afrin and Aleppo, escalating tensions with HTS who are attempting to reassure Kurds of their safety in the new Syria. Syria’s new leaders must work to de-escalate tensions and build cohesion, or else risk isolating the SDF and therefore losing access to the east.
Recent Israeli military action could also pose a threat to the security of the new regime. Shortly after the fall of Assad, Israel launched over 400 airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure, and have pushed ground troops into a UN demilitarised buffer zone between Syria and the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. Further Syrian territory has been occupied, reaching as far as 15 km from Damascus. HTS has been careful not to antagonise Israel, condemning the move but emphasising that they do not wish for conflict. Rather than escalating tensions further, HTS have attempted to gain Israel’s trust by taking a strong stance against Iranian weapon’s supply chains to Hezbollah that previously relied on Assad’s cooperation.
The new regime faces a volatile diplomatic landscape that could spill over into conflict at any minute. Amidst such a complex web of aspirations, long term stability will not come overnight, and will likely require years of careful negotiation.
Prioritising state-building
After 60 years of oppression and exploitation at the hands of the Assad family, rebuilding trust in a state that serves the interests of the people is the most important way to ensure Syria does not backslide into chaos.
Skeptics have highlighted that the transitional government is largely composed of the same figures who led the HTS administration in Idlib, suggesting this could signal an intent to monopolize power. HTS leadership in Idlib also reportedly severely repressed opposition, which leads many to be wary of the caretaker government’s intentions.
However, al-Sharaa has been careful to emphasise that this is a transitional government, and that the Idlib model cannot serve as a model for Syria as a whole. Before taking the capital, al-Sharaa outlined his plans to create a representative state, based on institutions and “a council chosen by the people”. It seems that HTS leadership may be acutely aware of the failings of neighbouring transitional governments, and have been taking steps towards fostering an inclusive government to ensure cohesion. Sectarian divisions played a significant role in the collapse of the transitional government in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and led to years of civil war. Importantly, HTS have been outspoken about their commitment to the protection of Kurds, as well as the establishment of its directorate of minority affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. The new government has also emphasised the encompassing nature of the new constitution that will address the rights of all segments of Syrian society.
The missteps following the Libyan revolution demonstrate the key to preventing a descent into chaos lies in prioritising the state building process, through the preservation and development of state institutions.
Gaddafi’s monopoly on political decisions left the majority of state institutions very weak, which meant that after the revolution there were no functioning state institutions left to rebuild Libya. This left the transitional government with the impossible task of establishing a new democracy with no functioning institutions, and no military to hold back the surge of competing armed factions. Although to a lesser extent, the Assad regime kept state institutions politically weak and appointed family members to lead them in order to bend them to his will.
However, al-Sharaa has been extremely clear about his desire to focus on the protection of state institutions. Syrian public institutions have not been taking over by force, and have continued to operate under the control of some of the former regime’s civil servants and bureaucrats. A central focus of the new regime’s bureaucratic reforms seems to be streamlining efficiency by addressing the systemic corruption that characterised the Assad regime. These are encouraging signs that suggest Syria’s new leaders are prioritising rebuilding rather than vengeance, and have learned important lessons from the instability that so often followed similar Arab revolutions.
Crucially, the former oppressive state security agencies have been dismantled, but a general amnesty for regime soldiers has been issued in order preserve the unity of the military and prevent internal armed struggle during political reconstruction. This was a critical mistake by the departing US forces in Iraq, who dismantled the national army which allowed Iraq to descend into civil war.
It still remains to be seen whether the country will actually uphold its promise of inclusive governance. Elections may take up to four years to organise, and there is some doubt as to whether the government will truly be representative.
Nevertheless, it is clear that to bring stability amongst the delicate power balance in Syria, institutional state-building must be the priority of the caretaker government. However, in order to truly begin the process of rebuilding, sanctions must be lifted so the Syrian economy has a chance to stand on its own.
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