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Trump’s Return: What this means for the Fragile Balance in the Middle East

Udaya Pal



Donald Trump’s incoming return to the White House has many skeptical and concerned about the implications for the future of US relations with the Middle East. He’s been very vocal about his desire to return to a time of US isolationism, outlining a foreign policy characterised by high tariffs, transactional relationships, and a rejection of multilateral organisations. His first term demonstrated his appetite for reckless and aggressive behaviour, but his ambitions were curbed by an uncooperative political establishment. Now, he comes into office with the Republican party seemingly firmly under his thumb, and both houses of the Congress under Republican control. How will his new foreign policy agenda manifest itself amongst an incredibly volatile Middle East?

 


The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has changed significantly since his last spell in power, and the region is currently facing its most serious challenges for generations.

          

However, US Middle East policy has remained fairly consistent through presidential shifts in recent years. Obama, Trump and Biden all structured their approaches around ensuring regional order, premised on Arab Israeli normalisation (repeatedly failing to make progress towards Palestinian statehood). Trump in his second term isn’t expected to deviate from this agenda or dramatically upend any existing regional alliances; but this isn’t to say that Trump’s second term will simply be an extension of the Biden era. His aggressive, ad hoc brand of politics will undoubtedly manifest itself in his Middle East policy, but it remains difficult to predict how this will affect the fragile balance in the region.

 


Israel-Palestine Conflict – No End in Sight

 

Trump’s self-portrayal as a master of international peace brokering, as well as his self-stated opposition to American foreign involvement may lead some to believe that his administration may work towards peace between Israel and Hamas.


Considering how Trump’s last administration treated the conflict, however, it is clear that securing a long-lasting peace that takes into account the aims and protections of the Palestinian people is unlikely to be his priority this time. His last term in office ended with the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, alongside the cancellation of UNRWA funding and a $200 million reduction in aid to the Palestinian Authority. There is rising concern that Trump could continue making impulsive decisions, further destabilizing the delicate situation and threatening fragile peace between Israel and its enemies.

          

His cabinet and diplomatic nominations also signal a difficult future for Palestinians. Nowhere is this more evident than in his choice of Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. Huckabee has openly questioned the legitimacy of a distinct Palestinian identity, stating, 'there really isn’t such a thing.' He firmly opposes a two-state solution, supports expanding Israeli settlements and asserting Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, and denies the existence of an ongoing occupation in the region.

          

Biden’s stance on Israel faced heavy criticism (and probably cost him politically), for allowing Netanyahu to continue his campaign against Palestine and Lebanon with full impunity, regardless of the scale of destruction and its human impact. This is expected to continue under Trump, with even more rigour. He’s debated sanctioning the ICC following the announcement of their arrest warrant for Netanyahu, and publicly challenged the ICC’s legitimacy over Israel. Ultimately, Trump’s second term in office won’t do much for bringing about meaningful peace to the conflict, and will possibly worsen the condition of the already devastated Palestinian population.

             

Trump’s new administration is expected to view Gulf-Israeli normalisation as one of its central regional priorities. The Abraham Accords, one of the most notable of his foreign policy achievements, have only been signed by two Gulf states (UAE and Bahrain). Trump may well focus on bringing other key regional players on board, as part of his efforts to frame himself as a revolutionary peacemaker.


The Biden administration has repeatedly promised Saudi Arabia enhanced security ties with the US, as well as access to advanced military technology (similar to what UAE received upon signing). If Trump succeeds in bringing peace to the Israel Palestine conflict, Saudi Arabia could perhaps be persuaded to join the accords. However, this now seems unlikely, given Saudi Arabia's prerequisite of Palestinian statehood, a goal that appears improbable under Trump’s leadership.


 

Escalating Tensions with Iran?

 

Possibly the largest difference between Biden and Trump’s Middle East approach will be in how he handles Iran. Trump pursued a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy against Iran during his first term, and made Iran one of his foreign policy focal points. Biden hadn’t taken such a hard stance on Iran until the war on Gaza, but Trump has already expressed that this will soon change, as he prepares to resume where he left off with Iran.


Trump’s reckless unpredictability in dealing with Iran previously worsened tensions and now threatens to escalate the situation further during a precarious time for the region. His sudden withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, without consulting Congress or other signatories, has led to Iran reportedly enriching uranium up to 60% purity (Tehran were only permitted to enrich up to 3.67% under the terms of the former deal). The designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation (marking the first time the US labelled a government entity as such) fuelled Tehran’s anger, but the most significant escalation occurred with the assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. The airstrike (on Iraqi soil) was viewed by Iran as an act of war, prompting the launch of retaliatory strikes on US bases, and is an act Tehran have stated they still want revenge for.


Heightened conflict with Iran would spell disaster with the region, especially given the ongoing conflicts currently being fought by Iranian-backed proxies. Furthermore, Trump would struggle to find regional allies to support in his efforts against Iran. China’s efforts to broker a Saudi-Iranian peace deal seem to have succeeded, as evidenced by the recent visit of the Saudi military chief of staff to Tehran.

 


Stable Relations with the GCC

 

Trump’s last administration maintained good ties with the Gulf states. The energy sector will be a key concern for both parties, with Trump’s pro fossil fuel agenda quite possibly providing a boost to the hydrocarbon ambitions of many of the oil producing powers in the region.


However, this is unlikely to slow their clean energy transition goals. Gulf climate policies such as net zero and clean energy are largely driven by economic diversification strategies, aimed at reducing dependency on oil revenue as well as growing domestic concerns over energy security. Additionally, global financial flows have been increasingly in favour of green energy investments. In 2023, new wind and solar installations surpassed all other contributions to the global energy mix, and by the end of 2024 clean energy investments are expected to exceed $2 trillion (2/3 of global energy investment). Gulf energy transition policy is to keep up with the shifting energy market, and will most likely remain unhindered by Trump’s enthusiasm for fossil fuel.


Trump’s personal organisation has multi billion housing and real estate developments in Saudi Arabia and Oman, strengthening his own personal relationship with these regional hegemons. Another unconventional figure who may play a key role in Trump’s Gulf diplomacy will be his son in law Jared Kushner. Affinity Partners, Kushner’s private equity firm, has received heavy investment from both UAE and Qatar, as well as a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. Kushner won’t hold a formal position in the administration but is expected to play an active role in diplomacy, as he did during the Al Ula Summit in January 2021, which addressed the GCC rift with Qatar.

 


An escalation of the war in Yemen?

 

The war in Yemen has caused one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises in the world, with over 21 million people in need of assistance. During Trump’s last administration, significant arms sales to UAE and Saudi Arabia were approved, as well as logistical support for coalition airstrikes. Biden’s Yemen policy brought an end to weapon sales, and showed support for a UN-led peace process (but resumed air strikes after Houthi attacks on Red Sea cargo ships).  Trump is expected to shift significantly from Biden’s approach, possibly resuming weapons sales and returning to a much stronger stance against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels as part of his return to a ‘maximum pressure’ Iran strategy.


Trump will likely expand the scope of military operations against the Houthis, and possibly escalate maritime and air operations as well as increase support for Arab coalition led military action against them. Sanctions against the Houthi rebels and their finances may also be intensified, all of which would only serve to worsen the humanitarian emergency amongst the Yemeni population.

 


The road ahead

 

Ideally, Trump’s approach should focus on tackling the many humanitarian crises currently devastating the region, through increased aid relief and diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem like it will be a priority of the incoming administration. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to facilitate progress on issues like Palestinian statehood and negotiations to end Yemen’s civil war, but these long-term goals appear highly improbable under Trump’s leadership.


Crucially, the Middle East cannot afford for Trump to return to his erratic ‘foreign policy by tweet’. Civilians have suffered unimaginably already, and the region’s ongoing conflicts could spiral even further out of control at any time. Right now, the Middle East needs Trump to be a mediator, not a catalyst.



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