Udaya Pal The fall of the brutal Assad regime on the 8th of December was rightly celebrated across the world, just as the horrors of the regime became painfully clear. However, as the dust settles, serious concerns are emerging amongst observers who fear that Syria could follow Libya’s post-revolution trajectory into collapse. Further doubts about the future of Syria’s leadership have been cast by those who highlight the former al-Qaeda connections of the leaders of the rebel coalition, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In this decisive moment, the question arises – how can Syria begin to recover from 60 years of ruthless oppression and 14 years of devastating civil war?   The path to economic recovery   The Syrian economy has crumbled under the Assad regime. The Syrian pound’s value has been drained, and inflation has reached triple digits. Foreign currency reserves were estimated at $10 billion, but today are estimated to stand at around $200 million. 70% of Syrians are living in poverty, with 1 in 4 Syrians experiencing extreme poverty. The UN reports that over 16.7 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian support. Aid funding for those in need of food and access to water will undoubtedly have to be the first priority for the new government.          Years of devastating regime and Russian bombing campaigns have destroyed Syria’s physical infrastructure. Roads have been destroyed, and the power grids and water pipelines have been critically damaged. The estimated reconstruction costs are estimated to be between $250 billion to $450 billion.          Rebuilding the economy in the long term will be an incredibly challenging task. Wheat and fuel exports were the backbone of the Assad economy before the outbreak of the war, but the regime’s scorched earth tactics and destruction of critical infrastructure destroyed all output. Losses in the previously crucial oil sector are estimated to have amounted to around $91.5 billion between 2011 and 2021. Assad’s long string of human rights abuses led to crippling international sanctions, which drained business activity and therefore any tax revenue. The regime’s largest export and main revenue stream became illegal amphetamines, transforming Syria into one of the world’s largest narco-states.  Attempting to revive domestic drivers of growth, like agriculture and small-scale manufacturing, may bring some stability. Unfortunately, the lack of critical physical infrastructure for water and power supply, as well as farmland itself, poses a significant challenge. Additionally, the majority of Syria’s oil and gas fields, along with 60% of its wheat production, are located in the east, which is currently controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Given the potential size of the hydrocarbon sector, the transfer of these resources back to the new government will be a critical step towards financing the gargantuan reconstruction efforts.             Regardless, given the small size of Syria’s economy, long term growth and development won’t be possible without access to foreign capital and technology. The new leadership has begun to implement liberalisation reforms, but real progress requires the removal of international sanctions.          In recent days, EU foreign ministers have agreed to begin easing sanctions to allow the flow of humanitarian aid. This easing of sanctions is conditional on commitments for an inclusive transition, signalling their cautious stance towards HTS. The Biden administration eased similar restrictions to allow the flow of aid, but have not yet formally lifted any sanctions. However, attempts to suspend USAID under Trump have thrown uncertainty over the prospect of further cooperation.          HTS has been designated as Foreign Terrorist Organisation by the US since 2004, which further complicates the process of relaxing sanctions. However, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa (otherwise known by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammad al-Joulani) has been persistent in his attempts to distance the group from al-Qaeda, and demonstrate that they are a moderate group who only strive for the removal of Assad. Their evolving stances, such as their recent public commitments to protect religious minorities and refrain from retributive violence, show a desire to be embraced by the international community. The Biden administration lifted the $10 million bounty on his head, possibly suggesting recognition of al-Sharaa’s efforts to present a more moderate image. Past US policy on similar groups such as FARC in Colombia show that delisting a group from the FTO list is possible, if the group demonstrates a genuine commitment to peace. HTS have been attempting to show this, as well as a dedication to preventing more extremist actors from trying to capitalise on this situation to seize power. Recent backchannel intelligence sharing between HTS and the US in the fight against IS also suggests that the US may be warming to the idea of a new strategic partner in Syria. HTS could also serve as a valuable asset in U.S. strategic efforts against Hezbollah and the Iranian-backed militia Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. Nonetheless, the caretaker government’s ambitions for Syrian participation in the global economy are still shackled by US sanctions. Cooperation under Biden is an encouraging sign, but must continue under Trump to ensure Syria can emerge from the economic ruin left behind by the ousted regime.   Securing lasting stability Following the outbreak of the civil war, Syria became a hotbed of instability with a complex array of armed factions competing for conflicting ambitions. The rebel coalition may have secured control of the capital, but the transitional government now faces the challenge of balancing these lingering interests to prevent descent into further conflict.          Northeastern Syria still remains largely in control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a Kurdish-led coalition of small militias that serve as the unofficial military force for the de facto autonomous region of Rojava in northeastern Syria. The SDF were created with strong US support, and have been their main partner in the fight against IS. The force is led by the People’s Protection Units (YPG), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Their PKK affiliation has drawn strong opposition from Turkey, leading to years of conflict between the two sides.          The SDF are the only armed faction not to surrender their weapons to the new Syrian defence ministry. The SDF aren’t pushing for an independent Kurdish region in Syria, but have proposed that they be allowed to form their own autonomous Kurdish military bloc. This has been explicitly rejected by Damascus, who have instead pledged to integrate individual members or units of the SDF into the new Syrian army based on merit. Al-Sharaa has been outspoken about his desire to find a middle ground with the SDF, and has expressed willingness to accommodate Kurdish self-administration institutions by restructuring them to align with other government bodies. He has also been very vocal about his commitment to ensuring the return of displaced Kurdish and other minority residents, especially in Afrin, while addressing historical injustices by pushing for full citizenship rights for Kurds.          Negotiations between the two sides have slowed in recent days. Damascus demanded the removal of non-Syrian PKK fighters from Syrian territory, but the PKK has tied their withdrawal to guarantees of SDF control over the east. In response, Turkey has escalated action against the YPG with airstrikes over recent weeks. Rising Turkish-Kurdish tensions create the risk of serious regional fragmentation that could drag the nation back into crisis.            Turkey also provides backing to many factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), who played a major role in the rebel coalition forces. They are an umbrella of several armed factions in northern Syria, who have often clashed with each other, but all share the same opposition to the Assad regime. Many factions of the SNA have taken part in Turkish military operations against the YPG in northern Syria. SNA fighters have also been accused of serious human rights abuses against Kurdish communities in Afrin and Aleppo, escalating tensions with HTS who are attempting to reassure Kurds of their safety in the new Syria. Syria’s new leaders must work to de-escalate tensions and build cohesion, or else risk isolating the SDF and therefore losing access to the east. Recent Israeli military action could also pose a threat to the security of the new regime. Shortly after the fall of Assad, Israel launched over 400 airstrikes on Syrian military infrastructure, and have pushed ground troops into a UN demilitarised buffer zone between Syria and the Israeli occupied Golan Heights. Further Syrian territory has been occupied, reaching as far as 15 km from Damascus. HTS has been careful not to antagonise Israel, condemning the move but emphasising that they do not wish for conflict. Rather than escalating tensions further, HTS have attempted to gain Israel’s trust by taking a strong stance against Iranian weapon’s supply chains to Hezbollah that previously relied on Assad’s cooperation. The new regime faces a volatile diplomatic landscape that could spill over into conflict at any minute. Amidst such a complex web of aspirations, long term stability will not come overnight, and will likely require years of careful negotiation.   Prioritising state-building After 60 years of oppression and exploitation at the hands of the Assad family, rebuilding trust in a state that serves the interests of the people is the most important way to ensure Syria does not backslide into chaos.          Skeptics have highlighted that the transitional government is largely composed of the same figures who led the HTS administration in Idlib, suggesting this could signal an intent to monopolize power. HTS leadership in Idlib also reportedly severely repressed opposition, which leads many to be wary of the caretaker government’s intentions. However, al-Sharaa has been careful to emphasise that this is a transitional government, and that the Idlib model cannot serve as a model for Syria as a whole. Before taking the capital, al-Sharaa outlined his plans to create a representative state, based on institutions and “a council chosen by the people”. It seems that HTS leadership may be acutely aware of the failings of neighbouring transitional governments, and have been taking steps towards fostering an inclusive government to ensure cohesion. Sectarian divisions played a significant role in the collapse of the transitional government in Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and led to years of civil war. Importantly, HTS have been outspoken about their commitment to the protection of Kurds, as well as the establishment of its directorate of minority affairs that has guaranteed the safety of Christians and Alawites under its control. The new government has also emphasised the encompassing nature of the new constitution that will address the rights of all segments of Syrian society.      The missteps following the Libyan revolution demonstrate the key to preventing a descent into chaos lies in prioritising the state building process, through the preservation and development of state institutions. Gaddafi’s monopoly on political decisions left the majority of state institutions very weak, which meant that after the revolution there were no functioning state institutions left to rebuild Libya. This left the transitional government with the impossible task of establishing a new democracy with no functioning institutions, and no military to hold back the surge of competing armed factions. Although to a lesser extent, the Assad regime kept state institutions politically weak and appointed family members to lead them in order to bend them to his will. However, al-Sharaa has been extremely clear about his desire to focus on the protection of state institutions. Syrian public institutions have not been taking over by force, and have continued to operate under the control of some of the former regime’s civil servants and bureaucrats. A central focus of the new regime’s bureaucratic reforms seems to be streamlining efficiency by addressing the systemic corruption that characterised the Assad regime. These are encouraging signs that suggest Syria’s new leaders are prioritising rebuilding rather than vengeance, and have learned important lessons from the instability that so often followed similar Arab revolutions. Crucially, the former oppressive state security agencies have been dismantled, but a general amnesty for regime soldiers has been issued in order preserve the unity of the military and prevent internal armed struggle during political reconstruction. This was a critical mistake by the departing US forces in Iraq, who dismantled the national army which allowed Iraq to descend into civil war.     It still remains to be seen whether the country will actually uphold its promise of inclusive governance. Elections may take up to four years to organise, and there is some doubt as to whether the government will truly be representative. Nevertheless, it is clear that to bring stability amongst the delicate power balance in Syria, institutional state-building must be the priority of the caretaker government. However, in order to truly begin the process of rebuilding, sanctions must be lifted so the Syrian economy has a chance to stand on its own.            Sources              https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/15/israel-intensifies-syria-attacks-but-hts-leader-says-doesnt-want-conflict   https://www.mei.edu/publications/will-damascus-sdf-negotiations-lead-agreement-or-escalation   https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-landed-us-terrorist-lists-and-why-it-should-stay-there-now   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/7/us-pauses-select-restrictions-on-syria-offering-hope-on-western-sanctions   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/1/7/us-pauses-select-restrictions-on-syria-offering-hope-on-western-sanctions   https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/syria-after-assad-what-know-about-hts-hezbollah-and-iran   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/1/16/is-syrias-sanctions-hurting-the-population-more-than-the-regime   https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2025/1/8/rebuilding-syrias-economy-can-stability-return-after-war   https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099515505222471242/pdf/IDU12e419274142fc14ff31baf411ef0c0aef81c.pdf   https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/us-blueprint-for-syria-transition/   https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2024/12/16/syrias-new-rulers-must-not-repeat-the-past-mistakes-of-lebanon-and-iraq   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/turkish-strikes-hit-water-power-infrastructure-syrias-kurdish-held-northeast-2024-01-15/   https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/syria-lists-conditions-end-rift-sdf   https://www.mei.edu/publications/will-damascus-sdf-negotiations-lead-agreement-or-escalation   https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/while-international-support-crucial-syrians-must-lead-their-countrys-political-transition https://www.semafor.com/article/12/10/2024/economic-consequences-of-rebuilding-syria

Aryanee Nair Fast fashion and fast food. The alliterative pair serves as a sonic anchor, suggesting urgency and immediacy which are central to both industries. The fluidity and catchiness emphasises the nature of modern consumer behaviour, where speed takes precedence over deliberation and ethics. Both of which are emblematic of a capitalist system that prioritises consumerism over moral considerations. The fast-food industry is not just a business but a microcosm of the larger trends in global capitalism. These trends include: labour exploitation, commodification, overconsumption, and the persistent push for profit maximisation at the expense of both workers and consumers. Despite this, the successful blueprint that the fast-food industry has created for fashion and every other good that can be mass produced, needs to be acknowledged. Following the framework of supply and demand, acknowledgement is the first step consumers need to take in order for change to take place in regards to the negative externalities of global capitalism. As consumers are the main characters in a world full of markets, by adjusting their preferences, consumers can shift market equilibrium, encouraging businesses to internalise external costs and move towards more sustainable and ethical practices.  With the help of social media, news spreads like wildfire, raising awareness of the controversies surrounding major players in both fast fashion and fast food. Brands like  Shein  and  Zara have faced criticism for labor exploitation, particularly involving child labour, while  McDonald’s has been criticised for underpaying employees and contributing to unhealthy diets. Yet, consumer behavior remains largely unchanged. Consumers are assumed to be rational beings that make rational decisions. Yet, this rationality primarily serves to minimise their own discomfort rather than ensure ethical choices. As capitalism encourages efficiency, consumers become increasingly accustomed to the convenience that technology continues to enhance. Hence, despite allegations – whether substantiated or not –  consumers prioritise convenience over morality . Moreover, with the lack of information and transparency regarding the process of production, consumers are so distant – both physically and psychologically –  from the products they purchase, making it easier for them to ignore or justify ethical concerns. The beauty of cognitive dissonance  is demonstrated here as individuals reconcile their actions with their values, even when those actions conflict their ethical beliefs. From the production side, brands rely on this cognitive dissonance and consumer manipulation to cultivate a sense of urgency, imbuing their need for goods in order for there to be a persistent cycle of demand. Fast food companies  target children with advertisements, creating brand loyalty from a young age. Ronald McDonald, McDonald’s mascot, helped to market the company as a safe space for families, personifying the brand. Similarly, fast fashion fosters a perpetual urge among consumers to constantly update their wardrobes. Social media influencers and collaborations with celebrities amplifies an insatiable appetite for the latest trends, fueling an unrelenting desire for immediate access to new styles. Both industries thrive on instant gratification to boost their sales and maximise profits, as capitalism encourages.  The large trends of global capitalism are less trends and are more systematic problems of the capitalist system we live in. Apart from efficiency, capitalism commodifies anything and everything. So long as there is a demand, a market can be created. The ethical issues behind this is already a pressing issue, but what is really concerning is the alienation  and as such dehumanisation that occurs. Workers are reduced to their jobs, making them more of a resource rather than an actual person and hence, in the eyes of their employers, are easily disposable. The exploitation of labour also means that workers risk getting underpaid and being placed in bad working conditions. Following this idea of reduction in value, commodification is another systematic issue brought about by capitalism. Commodification  strips away the complexities and richness of people, ideas, objects, reducing them to mere transactions or consumer goods. Once again, focused on marketability and profitability. Lastly,  overconsumption  leads to the overuse of natural resources and even the production of environmental waste, placing our earth in danger. Unfortunately, these are all detrimental and systemic issues that need to be addressed, it is hard to get rid of them. Though, there are many reasons, the main one would be capitalism’s self-reinforcing system  where economic, political and social realms are all built around profit-maximising. Attempts to alter this are often met with resistance from powerful economic stakeholders. The inertia of capitalism is an unwavering strength that cannot be stopped.  However, this systemic change must be implemented incrementally, relying on more conscious consumers and more aware citizens to drive the shift and establish policies that dismantle these ingrained issues. As already seen in many countries, the strengthening of labour laws is crucial in setting a boundary. Additionally, this article also advocates for boycotting products linked to child labour, both to protect children and empower consumers to make informed decisions. Moreover, increased transparency for supply chains and corporate accountability is something that is slowly being implemented. There can also be labeling standards set in place for ethical consumptions to help consumers in their decision making process. Lastly, governments have the capability and means to incentivise ethical business practices through the means of subsidies and recognition. Nonetheless, what is most important is that consumers gain more awareness but also feel the depth of their responsibility as players in the game of supply and demand, driven by global capitalism.  By drawing the parallels between fast food and fast fashion, we can better understand the broader systems of global capitalism that shape not only what we eat and wear, but also how we work, consume, and engage with the world around us. As both consumers and producers within this system, we are all interlinked  in a cycle that drives labour exploitation, commodification and overconsumption. By recognising these patterns, we are able to critically examine and challenge the system that governs our daily life, empowering us to make more informed decisions. Ultimately, contribute to a more ethical and sustainable future.

Abhay Venkitaraman Over the past decade, Canadian governments on both sides of the aisle have implemented reforms to the country’s child benefit regime. These efforts have significantly increased the generosity of welfare provision for households with children. What impact did these policies have – and with child poverty rates on the up in the aftermath of the pandemic, what more needs to be done? Across advanced economies, child poverty rates in the OECD   generally exceed  those for the general public. Child poverty has a detrimental impact on children subject to it. Alongside facing reduced life chances, children in poverty are disproportionately at risk of   social isolation , reduced   cognition , and psychological distress, alongside a wide range of other negative effects. Moreover, people impoverished in childhood tend to have   worse labour market outcomes  later in life. This increases their reliance on transfer payments, impacting society at large. One country that has taken steps to reduce child poverty is Canada. Over the past decade, the country has taken significant steps to improve the generosity of transfer payments targeted towards households with children. This analysis will focus on two in particular: the expansion of the Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) in 2015, and the implementation of the Canada Child Benefit (CCB) the year after; both these reforms have succeeded at reducing child poverty rates. However, their effectiveness at doing so has waned, highlighting the need for policy reforms. What are the UCCB and CCB? The  Universal Child Care Benefit (UCCB) was introduced in 2006 by Stephen Harper’s newly elected Conservative government. Payments were universal, meaning households were not excluded from receiving the UCCB based on their income. Moreover, they were taxable, meaning they were classified as income and therefore subject to income tax. Initially , only households with children below the age of 6 were eligible for the UCCB. However, in 2015, the government expanded the UCCB. Eligibility was increased, with all households with children below the age of 18 being able to claim the benefit. This was accompanied by more generous payments for children aged 0-5. That  same year, the Liberals, led by Justin Trudeau, won Canada’s general election, sweeping back into power with a majority of seats. Trudeau’s government proceeded to implement a radical overhaul of the country’s child benefit regime. In 2016, three welfare benefits – the UCCB, the Canada Child Tax Benefit (CCTB), and the National Child Benefit (NCB) – were replaced by the Canada Child Benefit (CCB). Unlike the UCCB, the CCB is means-tested and is not subject to income tax.   Currently , households can claim $7,787 per year (roughly £4,400) for each child under the age of 6 and $6,570 (roughly £3,700) for every child between the ages of 6 and 17. However, once a household’s adjusted family net income (AFNI) exceeds $36,502 (roughly £25,700), the amount of benefit a household receives falls as the household’s income increases. The rate at which benefit payments taper off depends on how many children a household has. The CCB represented a   “significant increase”  in benefits compared to the programmes it replaced. It put Canada in a position where its child benefit regime was   “especially generous” , particularly for low-income households, compared to the rest of the OECD. This increase in generosity was augmented by the   indexation of the CCB to inflation  in 2018, which ensures the value of CCB payments keeps up with living costs.  However, due to the fact the CCB represented the replacement of a universal benefit with a means-tested one, some high-income families faced   “reductions in benefits”  due to the policy. The impact of the UCCB expansion and CCB on child poverty Between  2015 and 2019, the share of children in low-income families fell from 20.9% to 17.7%.   Families  are classified as ‘low-income’ if their adjusted after-tax income is less than half of that of the median household. (Baker et al., 2021) finds that both the UCCB expansion and the CCB reduced child poverty, although the latter was more effective at doing so.  Other measures of living standards highlight the positive impact of the CCB. Men (Men et al., 2023) notes that the more generous payments the CCB provides for children under the age of 6 have reduced food insecurity within households with younger children. Placing Canada in a global context, the success of the policies is clear.   Between  2008 and 2018, the country experienced one of the largest declines in child poverty rates within the OECD. Canada saw a dramatic reduction in child poverty between 2019 and 2020. The share of children in low-income families fell from 17.7% to 13.5%, largely due to temporary pandemic-related welfare programmes.  However, the figure rose to 15.6% the year after and increased an   additional 2.5%  between 2021 and 2022. Importantly, anti-child poverty non-profit group Campaign 2000 has found that the CCB’s effectiveness at reducing child poverty has waned. Whilst, on average, the benefit has reduced the share of children in low-income households by 8.8%, it only did so by 7.8% in 2022. The impact of the CCB on labour supply A common concern surrounding means-tested benefits like the CCB is that they reduce work incentives. With means-testing, households gradually lose welfare benefits as they earn more. This reduces the opportunity cost of exiting the workplace and thus acts to reduce labour supply. Not only does this reduce economic growth, but the loss of labour income this disincentive generates undermines the ability of benefits to reduce poverty. Evidence regarding the CCB’s impact on labour supply is mixed.   (Baker et al., 2021)  finds that the implementation of the CCB had no significant impact on the labour participation of women. However,   another study  finds that secondary earners in households claiming the CCB’s benefits tapered off the more they earned “[significantly] decreased” their working hours in response. The authors note that almost all of this reduction in labour supply was attributable to women. Policy Recommendations Make children of non-citizen parents eligible for the CCB UNICEF Canada  has noted that a household’s eligibility for the CCB is tied to the immigration status of the parents. This means that even children born and residing in Canada may be unable to access the benefit if their parents are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents. This is especially unfair, given that those parents likely pay taxes to finance benefits they cannot claim. Allowing these households to claim the benefit would broaden the range of households eligible for the benefit, enhancing its ability to reduce poverty. This is especially the case given that immigrant households in Canada are   disproportionately likely  to be impoverished. That being said, implementing this policy is likely to be challenging politically, given the country’s current   anti-immigrant backlash . Universalise the CCB As aforementioned, means-tested benefits like the CCB distort work incentives because benefits taper off the more claimants earn. Furthermore, there is some empirical evidence that suggests the CCB does this, although other studies do not concur. Given the potential reduction in labour supply stemming from the means-testing of the CCB, it may make sense for the benefit to be universalised, such that a household’s income levels do not influence how much benefit they receive. This could limit the negative impact of the CCB on labour supply – particularly if universalisation is financed through economically efficient taxes. Alongside positive effects relating to labour supply, universal benefits are   typically  less complex to administer and are less prone to error and fraud than means-tested ones. Concluding Remarks Whilst the Canadian child benefit reforms of the past decade have left child poverty rates significantly lower than they otherwise would have been, it is clear that the country has a long way to go. The most recently available data suggests that over a million children are subject to the indignity of poverty and that the problem is only getting worse. The aforementioned policy recommendations would likely further efforts to address child poverty in a manner that minimises trade-offs. That being said, it is unlikely they will be implemented in the near future, given a Conservative government with hardline positions on both immigration and government spending lies on the horizon.

Jakub Fegyveres Carbon markets are, currently, a highly topical issue in contemporary environmental policy. Included as one of the three mechanisms for cross-border "voluntary cooperation" within the framework of the Paris Climate Agreement, they are currently one of the main drivers of emissions reduction, as well as providing a source of climate financing. Currently, there are 33 non-voluntary carbon markets in operation around the world, though this number looks set to grow. Presenting their 2023 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 143 of 154 Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) stated "that they plan to or will possibly use carbon credits [...] as a means to finance climate action and achieve national targets." In addition, at this year’s at Cop29, new rules for carbon markets were set out after previous deadlock on the issue, signalling a new intent and hope in this important sphere of climate policy. Therefore, it is appropriate to consider the shape carbon markets should take, and the ways in which they may be utilised to their fullest extent. Before doing that, however, some background is required. Put simply, carbon markets are a mechanism which enables the assigning of a price to a volume of the greenhouse gas (GHG), making possible its subsequent trading. This occurs either in the form of allowances or credits, traded on so-called “compliance” and “voluntary” carbon markets, respectively. Compliance markets, typically set up by states or regions, are entered by companies through legal obligation. They operate on a cap-and-trade system, meaning a total permissible volume of emitted carbon dioxide is decided upon. A set number of allowances , which allow their buyer to emit a certain volume of carbon dioxide (typically 1 tonne per allowance), is sold to the highest bidder through an auction process, unless freely given away, as is the case for some chosen industries. In contrast, as their name indicates, voluntary markets are not participated in under the threat of sanction, and they act as the venue for the sale of carbon credits , rather than allowances. This means that companies seeking to offset their emissions, or even become net-positive can, in theory, buy the requisite number of credits to justify these claims. It is worth underlining the importance of these markets’ potential success, as substantial and continuous emissions reductions are necessary in order to meet the 1.5°C target set in Paris in 2015, which would contribute towards avoiding the   worst effects  of warming. Further, the currently dire state of financing adaptability initiatives, especially in the Global South, also underscores the importance of the usage of carbon markets, especially the voluntary variant. As things stand, with the recently agreed   $300bn  New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) failing to meet expectations and requirements, this issue has gained renewed pertinence. There are two principal ways in which carbon markets should be improved to achieve these targets. The first applies to compliance markets, such as the European Union’s (EU), Japan’s or China’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), which operate on a cap-and-trade basis. The size and reach of this “cap” are often rightly called into question, given the markets’ substantial potential to act as an even larger force promoting emissions reduction. For instance, despite being the world’s largest carbon market, China’s ETS   only covers  around 40% of the country’s CO2 emissions.   It is worth mentioning, however, that markets such as the EU’s ETS do provide for a 62% emissions reduction by 2030, and virtually all markets are set up with a continually decreasing cap. Secondly, with a view to increasing their value, the cause of bolstering the markets’ credibility, a lack of which   experts view  as the cause of the two most recent carbon market crashes, should be given the utmost attention. This issue has gained increasing prominence, as research has necessitated questions of whether the agreements that underpin voluntary markets, designed to affect the removal of a given volume of carbon dioxide, are actually being honoured. In light of the recent   discovery  that 90% of carbon offsets issued by the biggest certifier are “worthless”, it is no surprise that voluntary markets have suffered from a lack of credibility, which has a real impact on their usage and, ultimately, the state of the climate. Similarly, a 2024   study  in Nature found that, of the projects it investigated, only 16% of the credits issued actually resulted in the promised offsets. Naturally, this justifiable lack of trust has stunted the growth of voluntary markets, worth less than   $1bn  as of 2023, and a 20%   dip  in the price per credit year on year. In practice, increasing trust in compliance markets could happen through a third-party review, or the widespread implementation of pre-determined standards and reporting procedures. There is evidence in the form of steps in the right direction in this area, namely in the form of the “ Core Carbon Principles ”, released recently by the Voluntary Carbon Market Integrity Council. If implemented properly, these standards could chart the course for considerable voluntary market growth, helping direct much-needed capital and investment towards adaptation efforts in the Global South.         Sources https://www.unep.org/topics/climate-action/climate-finance/carbon-markets https://unepccc.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/final-report-published-sep-2022.pdf https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/the-interplay-between-voluntary-and-compliance-carbon-markets_500198e1-en.html https://newclimate.org/news/the-promise-of-voluntary-carbon-markets-unlocking-finance-for-the-global-south-may-be-a-myth Summary for Policymakers — Global Warming of 1.5 ºC https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-53645-z https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/jan/18/revealed-forest-carbon-offsets-biggest-provider-worthless-verra-aoe https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2024/nov/10/cop29-what-are-carbon-credits-and-why-are-they-so-controversial https://carboncredits.com/carbon-credits-in-2024-what-to-expect-in-2025-and-beyond-250b-by-2050/#:~:text=Falling%20Prices&text=In%202024%2C%20the%20average%20price,more%20reliable%20and%20long%2Dlasting . https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/11/1157416

India Gordon The UK is at a pivotal moment in its history with the proposed Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying) Bill having passed its second reading in the last month. If approved, the Bill could transform end-of-life care in the UK, marking a significant step forward in patient autonomy. However, to truly ensure the safety and dignity of patients, adequate safeguards are needed to address the procedure’s intrinsic practical and ethical challenges. need to be robustly defined to protect vulnerable individuals while balancing its practical and ethical challenges. The Law The right to life underscores various human rights charters, including the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. Advocates of assisted dying argue that the procedure is an intrinsic extension of this right as individuals should be able to determine when and how they want to end their life. They believe that terminally ill patients are entitled to dignity in their medical autonomy, especially when all treatment options have been exhausted. In the UK, assisted dying remains illegal under the Suicide Act 1961, which prohibits anyone from assisting another in ending their life. While there have been numerous previous attempts for legislation change, no bill has succeeded in becoming law. However, with a recent poll finding that 75% of respondents supported the legalisation of assisted dying in the UK, policymakers face the challenge of balancing its potential practical and ethical considerations while preserving the dignity of terminally ill patients. The Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying) Bill Lobbied by MPs such as Kim Leadbeater and various patient advocacy groups, the Terminally Ill Adults (Assisted Dying Bill) proposes legislation reform that would allow patients aged 18 and above, who have been given a prognosis of six months or less in their terminal illness, the option to end their life with a doctor’s assistance should they wish to do so. The bill specifically stipulates that two doctors need to establish that the patient has adequate mental capacity to make a fully-informed decision, meaning they need to demonstrate that they are acting out of their voluntary wishes and understand the nature of the process and the potential effect it may have on their relatives. Therefore, the primary purpose of the bill is to prioritise patients' dignity in their decisions during the end stages of their life. The bill also looks to avoid the criminal prosecution of terminally-ill patients' relatives who travel with them abroad to countries like Switzerland, where over 500 British citizens have sought access to assisted dying services from Dignitas since its establishment in 2011.  The Opposing View: A ‘Slippery Slope’ Opponents of the bill, including senior MPs and religious organisations, believe that legal assisted dying procedures inherently risk a ‘slippery’ slope. They warn that there is space for potential misuse and coercion that could lead to a significant number of patients seeking assisted dying and expanding eligibility of conditions existing beyond originally proposed legislation. Those against assisted dying frequently cite the potential vulnerability of terminally ill patients to pursue assisted dying procedures if they feel pressured to. The risk of relatives who seek financial gain, such as inheritance, may exploit terminally ill patients’ vulnerability and coerce them into pursuing euthanasia. And even if there are no parties posing ill intent present, some patients may pursue assisted dying if they believe themselves to be an emotional or financial burden on their loved ones and healthcare services, in which case assisted dying becomes a seeming obligation rather than genuine choice. These practical concerns are further exacerbated by the psychological toll that terminal illness can have on people, which critics argue renders a patient’s capacity to make fully-informed decisions precarious in its objectivity.  Critics of assisted dying draw attention to the psychological toll that terminal illnesses can have on people, rendering their capacity to make fully-informed decisions precarious in its objectivity. Another significant concern of legislation is the potential for expanding the types of conditions that would deem a patient eligible for assisted dying services, which has already occurred in Switzerland and Belgium. While the Bill’s current proposal limits eligibility only to those with terminal physical illnesses, opposing parties fear that it could eventually seek to include mental health conditions. For instance, in May 2024, Zoraya ter Beek, a Dutch citizen, travelled to Switzerland to end her life after enduring years from chronic depression and anxiety. Her case sparked conversation about the ethical implications of extending assisted dying to individuals with non-physical conditions, raising questions about the boundaries of eligibility and the adequacy of safeguards to protect vulnerable individuals. While there are concerns about logistics and ethical challenges regarding euthanasia, proponents of the bill argue that by preventing the legalisation of assisted dying in the UK, citizens are faced with declining health which can worsen their quality of life in terms of their physical and mental wellbeing. And because options for assisted dying are only currently available abroad, patients may actually feel inclined to pursue it earlier than they may want to, as advocates argue that these patients may worry that their declining health will render them unable to in the future. Therefore, it is clear that individuals need access to end-of-life care without unnecessary delays or uncertainties. Conclusion: Future legislation Ultimately, the challenges facing these legislation exemplify the need for policymakers to ensure that any future legislation contains robust safeguards that protect the safety and dignity of terminally-ill patients. Avoiding coercion - The proposed Bill suggests that if doctors suspect patients are making decisions out of coercion or emotional manipulation, they can refer them to external psychologists. However, without formal training, doctors may only recognise overt signs of pressure, overlooking more subtle signs, which inherently undermine the necessity for patient autonomy. Assessing mental capacity - When assessing a patient’s mental capacity, a panel of multidisciplinary professionals should be consulted. Instead of solely relying on only two medical doctors’ judgements, combining the expertise of doctors, trained psychologists and clinical ethicists, would more reliably assess a patient’s mental state. This would mitigate the risk of wrongful decisions.  Address gaps in current palliative care - Finally, legislation could also benefit from improving the standards and availability of current palliative care. By ensuring that patients have access to adequate medical and emotional support, this minimises the risk of them choosing assisted dying due to feelings of isolation or unrelieved suffering. References Dignitas has helped 540 British people die, MPs told Public Opinion - Every parliamentary constituency in Great Britain backs assisted dying Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill The slippery slope of assisted dying BPS Response to the Assisted Dying for Terminally Ill Adults (Scotland) Bill: Health, Social Care and Sport Committee Call for Evidence

Aditi Someshwar The European Union is one of the most powerful and significant geographic blocs in history. The Union extends decision-making dominance across countries both within Europe and beyond, positioning itself as an overarching ideological faction with implicit power at the global stage. However, is being a member of the Union worth the price one pays in accession? This remains a question that begs an answer.   Who may enter the Union?  Being within the geographic confines of the European continent is not enough to be a part of the EU. This esteemed membership comes at a cost of conforming to the whims of dominant member states and their political beliefs - Germany, France, Belgium, formerly the UK. Many countries try consistently to attach themselves to this elite group, yet fall short of acceptance which is both caused by and causes great political turmoil. There are a plethora of complex reasons for why certain countries get chosen into the EU as compared to others. However, the most pertinent are expectations of dominant ideology, stability of political systems, and geopolitical implications.  Heavy Costs of Accession   Expectations of dominant ideology fall under the EU’s understanding of themselves as democratic, equitable, secular and implicitly capitalist. While their expectation of similar practices across member states is not noteworthy, the coercive power the EU can wield over these states in changing and influencing political practices is pertinent. If a state does not want to follow their rules and respect their basic values as aforementioned, they won't be admitted.  For instance, Turkey, which first bid to join the Union in 1987, still to this date remains on the outskirts of integration. 15 new member states have been accepted since they first made their formal application. The main pushback for Turkey as part of the EU comes from viewing the nation as ideologically distinct from the EU’s Identity, particularly in regards to frameworks of human rights and justice. France’s biggest objection to Turkey’s EU bid is their constitutional differences in human rights and press freedom which do not meet EU standards. This follows along the lines of standard criteria against which countries are scored when joining the Union and expected to amend domestic law for.  More importantly, the idea of pushing “ideological homogeneity” is not just directed towards aspiring member countries but already established members such as Poland and Hungary. These countries are repeatedly allocated less funds or no funds at all from significant European institutions because of their illiberal practices. These are heavy costs to bear for nations already a part of the Union, who without this funding suffer severe economic challenges. If we take the example of Hungary, we observe that the country permanently lost 1 billion Euros in funds from the EU as of 1st January this year. This comes at a difficult time for the nation amidst a recession and a consistently shrinking economy. These funds have been blocked on the grounds of concerns with rule of law, breaching of asylum rules and sidelining of earlier EU judgements. The EU affairs minister for Hungary, János Bóka, as quoted in the Financial Times, states that it is “very difficult” not to interpret the withdrawal of funds as “political pressure”. Further elucidating how nations which do not assimilate to the Union’s demand bear the cost of discrimination which has devastating impacts on their economy.  It is also imperative to mention however that certain countries are further isolated from joining the Union due to their perceived ideological standing as “separate” from that of the EU. Regardless of aspects of democracy and rule of law, Turkey also displays noticeable demographic differences with most EU countries, with a large Muslim population. This paints Turkey as separate from Europe in the minds of many EU citizens and governments; with an emphasis on the country’s incompatibility with the EU’s secular and liberal identity. While Turkey’s stance is both secular and modern as a state today, this taught perspective on the Islamic world taints their perception in the European continent.   The EU’s need for overarching ideological homogeneity goes hand in hand with their want of political stability which comes in the form of democratic governments and low civil unrest. Many countries such as North Macedonia have been tasked to create more constitutionally inclusive environments for the ethnic groups residing within the country and neighbouring them. The negotiations framework put forward with the country’s candidate status in July 2022 required them to undertake constitutional changes to include ethnic groups living in their country as protected and equal citizens. Including classifying the Bulgarians, Croats, Montenegrin, Jews and other minorities as part of these ethnic groups.  These inclusive strategies to establish political stability do not extend to the ongoing refugee crisis. In reality, countries with high numbers of refugees are deemed increasingly unstable due to their increased diversity. For instance a large concern with Turkey joining the EU is their status as the largest host of refugees within the region and the instability this population will bring to the region’s security, economies and culture.    Finally, geopolitical nuances command significant influence over nations and their accession into the EU. It is largely known that Russia aims to protect its borders through any means possible and hence places priority in controlling and actively participating in national proceedings of its neighbour states. This thwarts many nations’ want to be a part of the Union. Georgia is the latest country with a public desire to join the bloc in hopes of better economic growth and political stability that has its hopes blocked by the geopolitically charged position it finds itself in bordering Russia.  Georgia gained candidate status to the EU only in 2023, however 2024 saw the country lose progress as the Union claimed that Georgia adopted a law in favour of the Russians with its explicit interests in mind. 2024 also saw the Georgian Dream Party attain power in the national election, which came as a surprise to many citizens due to their anti-EU stance that goes against the majority of the public. This election has since been labelled rigged with interference from the Russian government and sparked nationwide protests against the ruling party. The situation has become increasingly precarious over the last months of the year. The Georgian public seems to be clear in its wants to join the EU and distance itself from Russia, however the government seems to have different beliefs. Further, foreign actors such as Russia itself seem to play a role in the decision making process of the nation, creating an even more upsetting reality for citizens. Russian interference is an imperative reason for the EU to vote against Georgian accession, leaving the nation’s citizens in a certain no-win situation with only detriments to themselves.  Any Answers?  The EU remains powerful as we enter 2025, hence acceptance into the block continues to be exclusive with significant consequences for those who wish to assimilate themselves. While the EU guarantees economic support and security, its implicit expectations are of homogeneity and stability, which only comes with an acceptance of set hierarchies. These expectations can come with a severe cost to many nations within the European continent. Whether the trade-offs are worth investing in is something only time will tell and citizens can decide.  References Akhfaitar, F. (2024, July 6). Analyzing Turkey’s EU membership status . Modern Diplomacy. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/07/analyzing-turkeys-eu-membership-status/ Baccini, F. (2024, December 27). Georgia’s democracy on the Brink: Protests continue amid allegations of rigged elections and Protestor crackdown . The Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/georgian-protesters-stand-up-to-increasingly-authoritarian-crackdown Biskup, P., Chorąży, P., Dzierżanowski, P., Kozioł, A., Kaca, E., Szczepanik, M., Szymańska, J., & Zając, T. (2024). (publication). 20 years of Poland in the European Union . THE POLISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. Retrieved January 3, 2025, from https://pism.pl/publications/20-years-of-poland-in-the-european-Union . Dunai, M., & Tamma, P. (2024, December 31). Hungary loses EU funds as economic slump deepens . Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/fe893219-7ac3-4ff4-a01f-5cfc3e99be7c?sharetype=blocked   Magiera, O. (2024, November 6). The path to EU membership: Where do the candidate countries stand? . European Newsroom. https://europeannewsroom.com/the-path-to-eu-membership-where-do-the-candidate-countries-stand/ Thomas Mackintosh, M. D. & R. D. (2024, November 30). Georgia: Thousands protest in Tbilisi after Eu bid suspended . BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c62jp68p315o Uras, U. (2023, September 20). Analysis: Is Turkey’s bid for EU membership over?  Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/20/analysis-is-turkeys-bid-for-eu-membership-over

Jakub Fegyveres What is the most important area of environmental policy? In my opinion, especially in this context, the relative importance of a given policy should be synonymous with, and measured by, its impact. It may be intuitive to turn to the most well-known policies; the ban on electric vehicles, or the 1.5-degree Celsius target agreed in   Paris  at COP21. These policies, and many others like them, were formed by educated policymakers, operating on the basis of a political mandate handed to them by an electorate sufficiently content with such advances. There is a school of thought, therefore, which emphasises the importance of the wider policymaking environment. In other words, the importance of adequate environmental education. The current state of school curricula from around the world, as they relate to climate change, is woefully inadequate. This point is easiest made with reference to the United States (U.S.), where fossil fuel companies are able to exercise an influence what the nation’s children learn to a shocking extent. In 2016,   for instance , a lobby group called the Oklahoma Energy Resources Board produced a book, which it distributed to the state’s schools free of charge. In it, a character called Petro Pete, who attends Petroville Elementary School, has a bad dream, in which all petroleum by-products disappear, making Pete’s life much more difficult. Upon waking, he cannot help but exclaim “all of my petroleum by-products are back!” American schooling is rife with examples of this kind of tacit industry promotion, which blurs the line between education and propaganda, ultimately producing a less informed populace, as it is designed to. There are less overt examples of this corporate influence, which is certainly not limited to the United States. British Petroleum (BP), for instance, rather than creating stories of children extolling the virtues of petroleum, prefers to advance its agenda by promoting a   neoliberal model  of STEM education. This is designed to “dissuade young people from questioning or understanding the role of corporate power in the climate crisis”, limiting the spectrum of environmental policies they might consider legitimate or beneficial. Placing the direct influence of multi-national corporations aside, it is also evident that national curricula are failing, even without their interference. A recent wide-ranging   survey  of teachers and students in 36 European countries found that, while 68% of students wanted to learn more about the environment and climate change, three quarters of teachers felt they lacked adequate training to deliver this education. Similarly, a 2019   Afrobarometer paper  placed the climate literacy rate across Africa at 37%, though with vast differences depending on region and level of education. The latter point has also been demonstrated in a European context, as a 2022   study  found that “Individuals with secondary or tertiary education were much less likely to deny climate change than those with primary level of education.” Needless to say, these facts underscore the need for a sufficiently robust climate curriculum in primary education. Any citizen’s basic understanding of a crisis of this magnitude should not be determined by their education level, which tends to   correlate  with their socio-economic circumstances. As long as it remains so, any body politic is entirely vulnerable to a politicisation of the question of the existence of anthropogenic climate change, which education of a sufficiently good quality renders vanishingly unlikely. However, while the issue remains in question, there is political capital to be gained from it,   especially  through   disinformation  and populist rhetoric, ultimately leading to   more damaging policies . Therefore, it is clear that climate change should play a central role in the curricula, beginning at the primary stage. As a first step, it is crucial that education receives recognition (and funding) as a legitimate and useful tool for combatting climate change, as well as disinformation about it. This is all the more important because of the politically disadvantageous nature of analogous policies, which only societally manifest themselves in the medium- to long-term. In addition, the   existing system  of confining teaching about the crisis to science-related subjects, even though experts contend that it should permeate across the curriculum more extensively. To   exemplify , a History lesson about the industrial revolution may mention the emissions it created, and first language lessons might engage with relevant literature. This   interconnectedness  should also extend to building awareness of the intersection between social justice and the climate crisis, challenging the aforementioned neoliberal narrative. Finally, as a more general point, it imperative that these teaching guidelines should emerge out of a detailed dialogue between the public,   experts  and policymakers. For this process to be most fruitful, it is also essential that it take place in an environment as free from politicization as possible,   ideally  within the auspices an international forum, such as the United Nations.     References https://www.teachthefuture.uk/blog/climate-education-is-lacking-across-europe https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/10091220/1/The%20Oil%20Industry%20in%20Our%20Schools%20FINAL%20SS%202020.pdf https://www.earthday.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Climate-Education-Report.pdf https://www.un.org/en/climatechange/climate-solutions/education-key-addressing-climate-change https://academic.oup.com/esr/article/38/1/153/6333558 https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement https://davidsuzuki.org/story/fossil-fuelled-deniers-in-politics-hurt-everyone/ https://www.ox.ac.uk/news/2021-01-12-link-between-climate-scepticism-and-support-right-wing-populists-study https://caad.info/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/The-Impacts-of-Climate-Disinformation-on-Public-Perception.pdf https://www.teachthefuture.uk/tracked-changes-project https://cdn.prod.website- files.com/5f8805cef8a604de754618bb/637d29ede1d41e1b334e55a3_Guiding%20principles.pdf https://www.earthday.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Climate-Education-Report.pdf Franta, B. (2021) ‘Weaponizing economics: Big Oil, economic consultants, and climate policy delay’, Environmental Politics  31:4, 555-575. Newell, P.; Paterson, M. (2010) Climate Capitalism . Cambridge University Press.

Udaya Pal Donald Trump’s incoming return to the White House has many skeptical and concerned about the implications for the future of US relations with the Middle East. He’s been very vocal about his desire to return to a time of US isolationism, outlining a foreign policy characterised by high tariffs, transactional relationships, and a rejection of multilateral organisations. His first term demonstrated his appetite for reckless and aggressive behaviour, but his ambitions were curbed by an uncooperative political establishment. Now, he comes into office with the Republican party seemingly firmly under his thumb, and both houses of the Congress under Republican control. How will his new foreign policy agenda manifest itself amongst an incredibly volatile Middle East?   The geopolitical landscape of the Middle East has changed significantly since his last spell in power, and the region is currently facing its most serious challenges for generations.            However, US Middle East policy has remained fairly consistent through presidential shifts in recent years. Obama, Trump and Biden all structured their approaches around ensuring regional order, premised on Arab Israeli normalisation (repeatedly failing to make progress towards Palestinian statehood). Trump in his second term isn’t expected to deviate from this agenda or dramatically upend any existing regional alliances; but this isn’t to say that Trump’s second term will simply be an extension of the Biden era. His aggressive, ad hoc brand of politics will undoubtedly manifest itself in his Middle East policy, but it remains difficult to predict how this will affect the fragile balance in the region.   Israel-Palestine Conflict – No End in Sight   Trump’s self-portrayal as a master of international peace brokering, as well as his self-stated opposition to American foreign involvement may lead some to believe that his administration may work towards peace between Israel and Hamas. Considering how Trump’s last administration treated the conflict, however, it is clear that securing a long-lasting peace that takes into account the aims and protections of the Palestinian people is unlikely to be his priority this time. His last term in office ended with the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, alongside the cancellation of UNRWA funding and a $200 million reduction in aid to the Palestinian Authority. There is rising concern that Trump could continue making impulsive decisions, further destabilizing the delicate situation and threatening fragile peace between Israel and its enemies.            His cabinet and diplomatic nominations also signal a difficult future for Palestinians. Nowhere is this more evident than in his choice of Mike Huckabee as ambassador to Israel. Huckabee has openly questioned the legitimacy of a distinct Palestinian identity, stating, 'there really isn’t such a thing.' He firmly opposes a two-state solution, supports expanding Israeli settlements and asserting Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank, and denies the existence of an ongoing occupation in the region.            Biden’s stance on Israel faced heavy criticism (and probably cost him politically), for allowing Netanyahu to continue his campaign against Palestine and Lebanon with full impunity, regardless of the scale of destruction and its human impact. This is expected to continue under Trump, with even more rigour. He’s debated sanctioning the ICC following the announcement of their arrest warrant for Netanyahu, and publicly challenged the ICC’s legitimacy over Israel. Ultimately, Trump’s second term in office won’t do much for bringing about meaningful peace to the conflict, and will possibly worsen the condition of the already devastated Palestinian population.               Trump’s new administration is expected to view Gulf-Israeli normalisation as one of its central regional priorities. The Abraham Accords, one of the most notable of his foreign policy achievements, have only been signed by two Gulf states (UAE and Bahrain). Trump may well focus on bringing other key regional players on board, as part of his efforts to frame himself as a revolutionary peacemaker. The Biden administration has repeatedly promised Saudi Arabia enhanced security ties with the US, as well as access to advanced military technology (similar to what UAE received upon signing). If Trump succeeds in bringing peace to the Israel Palestine conflict, Saudi Arabia could perhaps be persuaded to join the accords. However, this now seems unlikely, given Saudi Arabia's prerequisite of Palestinian statehood, a goal that appears improbable under Trump’s leadership.   Escalating Tensions with Iran?   Possibly the largest difference between Biden and Trump’s Middle East approach will be in how he handles Iran. Trump pursued a ‘maximum pressure’ strategy against Iran during his first term, and made Iran one of his foreign policy focal points. Biden hadn’t taken such a hard stance on Iran until the war on Gaza, but Trump has already expressed that this will soon change, as he prepares to resume where he left off with Iran. Trump’s reckless unpredictability in dealing with Iran previously worsened tensions and now threatens to escalate the situation further during a precarious time for the region. His sudden withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal, without consulting Congress or other signatories, has led to Iran reportedly enriching uranium up to 60% purity (Tehran were only permitted to enrich up to 3.67% under the terms of the former deal). The designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation (marking the first time the US labelled a government entity as such) fuelled Tehran’s anger, but the most significant escalation occurred with the assassination of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. The airstrike (on Iraqi soil) was viewed by Iran as an act of war, prompting the launch of retaliatory strikes on US bases, and is an act Tehran have stated they still want revenge for. Heightened conflict with Iran would spell disaster with the region, especially given the ongoing conflicts currently being fought by Iranian-backed proxies. Furthermore, Trump would struggle to find regional allies to support in his efforts against Iran. China’s efforts to broker a Saudi-Iranian peace deal seem to have succeeded, as evidenced by the recent visit of the Saudi military chief of staff to Tehran.   Stable Relations with the GCC   Trump’s last administration maintained good ties with the Gulf states. The energy sector will be a key concern for both parties, with Trump’s pro fossil fuel agenda quite possibly providing a boost to the hydrocarbon ambitions of many of the oil producing powers in the region. However, this is unlikely to slow their clean energy transition goals. Gulf climate policies such as net zero and clean energy are largely driven by economic diversification strategies, aimed at reducing dependency on oil revenue as well as growing domestic concerns over energy security. Additionally, global financial flows have been increasingly in favour of green energy investments. In 2023, new wind and solar installations surpassed all other contributions to the global energy mix, and by the end of 2024 clean energy investments are expected to exceed $2 trillion (2/3 of global energy investment). Gulf energy transition policy is to keep up with the shifting energy market, and will most likely remain unhindered by Trump’s enthusiasm for fossil fuel. Trump’s personal organisation has multi billion housing and real estate developments in Saudi Arabia and Oman, strengthening his own personal relationship with these regional hegemons. Another unconventional figure who may play a key role in Trump’s Gulf diplomacy will be his son in law Jared Kushner. Affinity Partners, Kushner’s private equity firm, has received heavy investment from both UAE and Qatar, as well as a $2 billion investment from Saudi Arabia’s sovereign wealth fund. Kushner won’t hold a formal position in the administration but is expected to play an active role in diplomacy, as he did during the Al Ula Summit in January 2021, which addressed the GCC rift with Qatar.   An escalation of the war in Yemen?   The war in Yemen has caused one of the worst ongoing humanitarian crises in the world, with over 21 million people in need of assistance. During Trump’s last administration, significant arms sales to UAE and Saudi Arabia were approved, as well as logistical support for coalition airstrikes. Biden’s Yemen policy brought an end to weapon sales, and showed support for a UN-led peace process (but resumed air strikes after Houthi attacks on Red Sea cargo ships).  Trump is expected to shift significantly from Biden’s approach, possibly resuming weapons sales and returning to a much stronger stance against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels as part of his return to a ‘maximum pressure’ Iran strategy. Trump will likely expand the scope of military operations against the Houthis, and possibly escalate maritime and air operations as well as increase support for Arab coalition led military action against them. Sanctions against the Houthi rebels and their finances may also be intensified, all of which would only serve to worsen the humanitarian emergency amongst the Yemeni population.   The road ahead   Ideally, Trump’s approach should focus on tackling the many humanitarian crises currently devastating the region, through increased aid relief and diplomatic efforts. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem like it will be a priority of the incoming administration. The U.S. is uniquely positioned to facilitate progress on issues like Palestinian statehood and negotiations to end Yemen’s civil war, but these long-term goals appear highly improbable under Trump’s leadership. Crucially, the Middle East cannot afford for Trump to return to his erratic ‘foreign policy by tweet’. Civilians have suffered unimaginably already, and the region’s ongoing conflicts could spiral even further out of control at any time. Right now, the Middle East needs Trump to be a mediator, not a catalyst. References https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/trumps-return-and-implications-for-the-middle-east/ The Washington PostTrump to designate Iranian military unit as a terrorist grou… ​ By Jonathan Swan, Kate Kelly, Maggie Haberman and Mark MazzettiKushner Firm Got Hundreds of Millions From 2 Persian Gulf Na… ​  By David D. Kirkpatrick and Kate KellyBefore Giving Billions to Jared Kushner, Saudi Investment Fu… ​ Jared Kushner expected to be pivotal to Trump admin’s Middle East efforts without taking a formal job | CNN Politics https://www.business-standard.com/world-news/saudi-arabia-s-sovereign-wealth-fund-plans-to-cut-overseas-investments-124102901539_1.html https://apnews.com/article/trump-huckabee-ambassador-israel-ace1894ce731c36622d5f09982a0a9b2?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2024/11/21/a-trump-storm-cometh-for-the-icc-00183727 https://www.timesofisrael.com/is-trumps-pick-of-huckabee-as-envoy-to-israel-a-harbinger-of-west-bank-annexation/?utm_source=chatgpt.com https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/13/who-is-mike-huckabee-the-evangelical-pro-settlement-envoy-to-israel?utm_source=chatgpt.com

Aditi Someshwar Food is central to all of our lives, an essential ingredient for our mind, body, and soul. It is also a severely overlooked dimension of how countries exercise power. Cuisine and culinary premise is an unconscious yet effective mechanism of influencing perception and image with very real world consequences in the form of bilateral treaties, trade agreements, and tourism.  Setting The Plate - Culinary Exchange To understand the way in which culinary diplomacy is practised, it is imperative to understand the different levels of depth within influence. The three successive steps to achieving significant soft power influence are cultural exchange, democratic change and systemic change. Cultural exchange demands the dissemination of propaganda on a global scale; the act of consuming food and acknowledging a culture via consumption allows people to experience the ideas of a culture in the most sympathetic manner. This cultural exchange is evidenced with the increasing popularity of South Korean cuisine worldwide, particularly with the notable household ingredient, kimchi. Through the South Korean government getting kimchi protected Unesco’s list of intangible cultural heritage, they were able to make a strong cultural statement and influence people across the world to internalise and take seriously cultural materials such as ingredients, cook books, restaurants involving their cuisine. Democratic change requires ‘alien’ food’s symbolisms, norms and messages to become ingrained into the society, where the local population actually start actually using and considering the foreign cuisine as a part of their own daily lives. Indian food in the UK follows this exactly as flavours like “Chai” and “Tikka Masala” have been completely adopted locally and considered a part of most British people’s usual food habits.   Finally, democratic change becomes systemic change when soft food-power (through cultural propaganda) has embedded the norms and values so deep within the government and society that it can play a role in effectively influencing decision making processes. This is where culinary diplomacy holds true power as it can influence policy. Serving the Platter - Policy Potential The first policy potential is in regards to the image and reputation management a country can levy through food culture. Sushi and Ramen culture has been well exported by Japan, with the aforementioned merit. Both products have been able to retain their Japanese identity while simultaneously being viewed as modern and trendy. The Japanese government has been committed to selling the correct image of Japan and has done so by strictly regulating customer experience globally. The Japanese Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries formed a panel of experts to inspect Japanese restaurants across the world for authenticity, with warnings and consequences for those that were not meeting standards. While Japan still only wields single-issue based soft power in this regard, its growing acceptance helps shape their global identity and the acceptance of their framed identity. Another major policy potential of culinary diplomacy is when strengthening ties of trade and tourism. This is successfully seen in Malaysia, where the government has focussed on food as a significant part of the tourism strategy. The Malaysian government has utilised food heritage to promote and improve ideas and perception of themselves as a perfect holiday destination given that food is believed to be a primary source of attraction for many tourist groups. Policy makers also saw this as a method to enhance their export sector. The “food paradise” that Malaysia branded itself as was majorly effective as it pushed for food tours and activities which both supported the local economy and allowed tourists to connect with the local culture intimately. Since the introduction of food tourism into the policy room, tourism numbers have increased significantly, and the sector now stands as the third largest contributor to the Malaysian economy.  Finally, the most optimistic use of food diplomacy is to influence conflict prevention through creating cross-cultural understanding and fostering community between various distinct groups. A pioneer instance of this is the annual food festival in France which promotes refugee chefs taking over restaurant kitchens across the country. The restaurants pay the chefs for their labour and cover costs while the festival gets a cut of profits which they donate to relevant charities. This cultural exchange through food deeply humanised refugees within the French community and fostered understanding and acceptance within the public. The festival has spread to the US and the UK as well, being practiced in major cities like New York, San Francisco and London.  Clean Plates - The Future  It is evident that culinary diplomacy leverages great soft-power influence and can lead to strong policy implications. However, it is pertinent to mention that we live in an incredibly globalised world, that has no means to stop exponentially expelling cultural borders. This raises great concerns for a future where culinary diplomacy continues to be increasingly effective. This discussion of homogenisation of culture is directly referenced in The End of History?  By Francis Fukuyama who argued for a framework of democratic peace. Hence, while it is clear that culinary soft power used effectively can promote nations to think and consume in a way that fosters cultural understandings that change ideologies, it also runs the risk of leading to no policy influence due to expedited growth of a unified global culture with fewer differences to exploit as diplomatic assets. References  Fukuyama, F. (2017). Francis Fukuyama (1989), “the end of history?”, the National Interest, 16, pp. 3-18 [173-89]. Foreign Policy, 197–214. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315255156-18 Fukuyama, F. (2020). The end of history and the last man. Penguin Books. Hussin, H. (2018). Gastronomy, tourism, and the soft power of Malaysia. Sage Open, 8(4). https://doi.org/10.1177/2158244018809211 The Indian influence in the UK: Beyond curry and culture . Sociology Institute. (2022, December 22). https://sociology.institute/diaspora-transnational-communities/indian-influence-uk-curry-culture/#the-journey-to-a-new-home-historical-migration-patterns Palat, R. A. (2015). Empire, Food and the Diaspora: Indian restaurants in Britain. South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38(2), 171–186. https://doi.org/10.1080/00856401.2015.1019603 Refugee Food Festival 2024. Refugee Food Festival 2024 - made with softr.io . (n.d.). https://festival.refugee-food.org/ Reynolds, C. J. (2012). The soft power of food: A diplomacy of hamburgers and sushi? Food Studies: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 1(2), 47–60. https://doi.org/10.18848/2160-1933/cgp/v01i02/40518 Safronova, V. (2024, January 23). Kitchen diplomacy: How governments use food as a soft power. The Parliament Magazine. https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/news/article/food-diplomacy-gastrodiplomacy-europe

Syed Hussain BRICS' ambitious bid to level the global financial playing field presents more questions than answers in the evolving landscape of international monetary relations. While the alliance's recent expansion and high-profile Kazan summit signal growing momentum, critical analysis reveals significant structural impediments to achieving true financial parity with the U.S.-led system. The summit's unprecedented attendance by over 30 nations, including EU partners and NATO member Turkey, suggests growing international interest in alternatives to Western financial dominance. The fundamental contradiction lies in BRICS' heterogeneous economic composition. With India's demographic expansion contrasting Russia's population decline, China's manufacturing dominance versus Gulf states' energy focus, and Brazil's agricultural emphasis, the bloc lacks the economic coherence necessary for monetary coordination. This diversity, while potentially advantageous for trade complementarity, poses serious challenges for currency stability and policy coordination. Furthermore, the absence of a unified central bank raises critical questions about monetary governance. The proposed gold backing (40%) for the "unit" payment system seems to ignore the historical lessons that led to the U.S. abandoning the gold standard in 1971. This regression to commodity backing could potentially limit monetary policy flexibility precisely when emerging economies need it most. China's dual strategy in particular exposes the limitations of BRICS' financial independence agenda. While Beijing supports Moscow through innovative "burner bank" arrangements, its careful maintenance of Western economic ties reveals a pragmatic recognition of continued dollar system dependence. This strategic hedging suggests even BRICS' most powerful member lacks full confidence in the bloc's financial alternatives. The recent behavior of Chinese banks, rapidly withdrawing from Russian transactions following U.S. secondary sanctions threats, demonstrates the practical limitations of operating outside the Western financial system. The current dollar system's dominance—evidenced by its role in 88% of global foreign exchange transactions and 60% of central bank reserves—stems from deep structural advantages that BRICS has yet to replicate: unparalleled market liquidity, transparent regulatory frameworks, entrenched payment systems, and a relatively predictable policy environment. Historical attempts at challenging dollar hegemony, from the Euro's introduction to various regional currency initiatives, illustrate the difficulty of displacing established financial infrastructure. The dollar's network effects and incumbent advantages have proven remarkably resilient. Technical challenges abound in the proposed "BRICS Bridge" payment system, including settlement mechanisms between disparate national systems, reserve management protocols, regulatory oversight frameworks, and cross-border dispute resolution procedures. The system's reliance on blockchain and digital currencies introduces additional complexities around technological infrastructure, cybersecurity, and regulatory compliance. Experience with existing cross-border payment innovations suggests that technical solutions alone cannot overcome fundamental issues of trust and governance. However, dismissing BRICS' initiatives entirely would be shortsighted. The bloc's effort represents a significant political signal about dissatisfaction with dollar hegemony. Even if the immediate challenge to dollar dominance remains limited, the push for alternative systems could accelerate the trend toward financial multipolarity. Three potential scenarios emerge: First, BRICS systems might gain traction primarily within member states and aligned nations, creating a parallel but limited financial ecosystem. Second, while BRICS alternatives may not dominate, they could prompt reforms in existing international financial institutions, leading to more inclusive global governance. Third, the initiative might contribute to a slowly evolving multipolar financial system, where different currency blocs coexist without clear dominance. Each scenario presents distinct implications for global financial stability and international trade patterns. For Western policymakers, BRICS' challenge necessitates careful recalibration. European Council President Michel's acknowledgment of Western "lecturing" suggests growing recognition that maintaining financial dominance requires more than technical superiority—it demands diplomatic finesse and responsiveness to emerging market concerns. The U.S. faces strategic choices between actively opposing BRICS initiatives (risking accelerated de-dollarization), engaging constructively to shape parallel systems, or reforming existing institutions to address legitimate grievances while preserving core advantages. Recent sanctions experiences have highlighted both the power and limitations of financial statecraft. For investors and market participants, BRICS' initiative demands attention without panic. While the dollar's near-term position appears secure, prudent portfolio diversification across currencies and markets becomes increasingly important. The potential for gradual shifts in global financial architecture suggests the need for flexible, adaptive investment strategies. Historical analysis of currency regime transitions indicates that such changes typically occur gradually, allowing markets time to adjust. BRICS' bid to level the global financial playing field faces formidable obstacles, yet its significance extends beyond immediate prospects for success. The initiative reflects deeper structural changes in the global economy and growing demands for more equitable financial governance. While revolutionary change appears unlikely, evolutionary adaptation of the global financial system seems inevitable. Recent developments in digital finance and changing geopolitical alignments may accelerate this evolution. The key question isn't whether BRICS will supplant dollar dominance, but how its challenge will reshape the international financial architecture. Success may ultimately be measured not in displacement of existing systems, but in catalyzing reforms that create a more balanced and inclusive global financial order. This suggests that while complete financial parity remains elusive, BRICS' initiative may succeed in tilting the playing field toward greater equilibrium—a development that could benefit the global financial system's stability and resilience in the long run. The challenge for policymakers and market participants alike will be managing this transition while maintaining global financial stability.

India Gordon This year, the UK witnessed a level of national violence not seen since the 2011 riots. However, the violence this time seemed to have a clear ideological fuel: far right-wing populist sentiments driven by anti-immigrant and Islamaphobic rhetoric. These views, having been repeatedly reinforced by leading political figures, mainstream media, and social media platforms, have become deeply ingrained in British society. From this perspective, the riots serve as just one stark example of the concerning spread of extreme right-wing thinking. The urgent question then is, what can policymakers do to prevent future outbreaks of violence? The July 2024 Riots This past summer, following the tragic murder of three young girls during a ‘Taylor Swift’ themed dance class, the UK witnessed an arguably unprecedented level of violent protest in response.  Across cities like Liverpool, London, and Birmingham, organised demonstrations quickly devolved into civil violence with widespread looting and assaults against many immigrant-owned small businesses, hotels housing asylum seekers, and mosques. The National Police Chiefs’ Council reported that over 1200 people were arrested for their involvement in the unrest, including nearly 150 juveniles. While the need to condemn the unlawful killing of these young children was undoubtedly important, the ‘protests’ that followed quickly spiralled into senseless violence largely motivated by far-right ideology. Many protesters fixated on the ethnic background of the perpetrator, echoing an anti-immigrant narrative that overshadowed the murders. This came after some online circles misidentified the latter as a ‘Muslim refugee’ who had arrived in the UK by crossing the channel last year. Such violence sparked a national conversation about race and immigration in contemporary British society, with prominent figures, such as MP Nigel Farage and far-right activist Tommy Robinson (real name Stephen Yaxley–Lennon), framing the Southport tragedy as a consequence of a national immigration ‘crisis’. Despite it later being revealed that the perpetrator of the attacks was a British-born citizen from Cardiff, the son of Rwandan first-generation immigrants, the rhetoric risked generalising and alienating all immigrants and their children as security risks, only fuelling further tension within communities. Furthermore, these riots were met with arguably an insufficient government response. The responses of key political figures seemed to only downplay the significance of the riots. Sir Keir Starmer, who had been elected as Prime Minister just a few weeks prior to the unrest, responded by calling the violence an act of ‘thuggery’. Such language was arguably dismissive,  treating the unrest as an isolated act committed by a minority of troubled individuals. However, such a view arguably fails to consider the bigger problem - that is, the 2024 riots are a symptom of long-standing anti-immigrant rhetoric, fueled by years of political and social turmoil. Recent years have seen increasing traction of far-right sentiments According to figures released by the Home Office, nearly 100,000 racially-motivated hate crimes have been seen in the past year, with a noticeable 25% increase in religious hate crimes compared to 2023. This troubling trend of incidents could be fundamentally explained by the increasing widespread dissemination of far-right ideology,  in no small part due to rhetoric peddled by leading political figures and media outlets. The Brexit campaign, spearheaded by then UKIP-leader Nigel Farage, built its platform off nationalist and anti-immigrant messaging. It primarily argued that contemporary immigration levels were unsustainable, redirecting blame for socio-economic disenfranchisement some citizens have encountered to immigrants. Mounting pressures facing the NHS, the lack of employment and access to adequate housing, and apparent increases in civil disobedience, have all been misattributed as products of immigration. This thinking evidently resonated with many voters. According to exit poll data conducted by Lord Ashcroft, over a third of ‘Leave’ voters cited concerns of immigration control as a primary motivation for their voting. Ultimately, however, it’s important to recognise that while socio-economic challenges may make some individuals susceptible to extremist rhetoric, this in no way excuses the violent actions, including those seen this past summer, that they choose to take. The increasing anti-immigrant sentiments perpetuated by influential figures and media outlets like the Daily Mail and Great British News (GBN) have only further stoked the fire of populist sentiment, producing a narrative that immigration poses an inherent threat to national security and heritage. For example, these outlets have repeatedly run misleading headlines concerning ‘nearly 4000 thousand’ foreign-born criminal individuals living in the UK, despite no sufficient evidence to back such claims. Meanwhile, Farage, a regular commentator for GBN, faced criticism for fuelling conspiracy theories after insinuating that authorities may have been withholding vital information regarding the identity and background, including the immigration status, of the Southport attacker. This pattern of misinformation and sweeping statements may only serve to enforce social divisions, fostering an ‘us vs. them’ mentality against immigrants and, in some cases, extending to those who don’t oppose immigration. Left unchecked, such divisive rhetoric has resulted in tragedy. For instance, the 2016 murder of Labour MP Jo Cox was committed by a far-right radical, who had come to disagree with Cox’s support for immigration during her advocating for the ‘Remain’ campaign. Online platforms have only amplified these extremists sentiments The dissemination of these anti-immigrant and far-right rhetorics have been facilitated by online spaces. The aforementioned misinformation regarding the Southport attacker’s identity originated online, quickly spreading and normalising racial prejudices. For instance, the Guardian reported that 38 charges had been filed following the riots regarding online hate speech, which included offensive language and the distribution of images ‘intending to stir up racial hatred’. This highlights the dangers posed by unregulated digital platforms in perpetuating extremist ideologies. Figures like Robinson have built significant online presences, and with a click of button have easily been able to rapidly mobilise mass support for their views. During the 2024 riots, Robinson took to X (formerly Twitter) to propagate strongly Islamophobic and xenophobic messaging. In fact, research from the Centre for Countering Digital Hate revealed that Robinson’s tweets had garnered more than 400 million views, demonstrating the sheer influence afforded by such platforms.  The buying of Twitter by Elon Musk has been linked to an increase in far right sentiment with Musk himself having used the site to voice his concerns regarding so-called ‘two tier’ policing in the UK - the notion that those of the right are treated more harshly than minority ethnic or left-leaning demonstrators. However, this could be considered hazardous misinformation since data published by the Home Office shows that black individuals are seven times more likely to be subjected to a ‘Stop and Search’, compared to their white counterparts. In fact, formal counterterrorism legislation has arguably failed to account for right-wing terrorism at all. This is because cornerstones of British counterterrorism legislation like the Prevent strategy, tend to overly focus on intervening in the early stages of Islamic extremism, leading to a disproportionate targeting of Muslim individuals. This neglect of recognition for other types of extremism can perhaps be explained by policymakers, like Starmer’s aforementioned ‘thuggery’ comments, inability to view far-right violence as a legitimate security threat.  Conclusion: Future Policy To combat the problem of increasing right-wing violence, policymakers should perhaps look to adopt more comprehensive legislation, particularly in digital regulation and social services. Holding Social Media Companies Accountable Although they are primarily private companies, these platforms arguably have a duty of care to prevent the dissemination of misinformation and harmful content, such as extremist views and hate speech. This can be achieved by implementing stronger regulatory standards. A few example practices may include stronger content moderation, more transparency regarding how algorithms prioritise user content, and more streamlined reporting methods for harmful content. Reforming Counterterrorism Legislation The limitations of UK’s counterterrorism legislation, particularly the Prevent strategy, should also be re-evaluated to account for the legitimate threat of far-right violence. This should primarily be done by recognising and reforming the current racial bias perpetuated by the strategy, as well as expanding its definition to include right-wing extremism.  Supporting Communities Any efforts to combat far-right violence would also benefit from more long-term considerations that aim to bridge the social tensions that arise from such divisive sentiments. It is imperative that policymakers tackle the root causes of extremism, such as underlying social inequalities and attitudes, especially when trying to reduce the appeal of far-right sentiments among young people. For example, communities may benefit from increasing funding for job training and education initiatives, especially in economically deprived areas. Additionally, mandatory critical media literacy lessons could help people to recognise misinformation and manipulated narratives, which would help to build individual accountability. Despite the chaos that unfolded this past summer, there remains hope for change. While many took to the streets to take part in the violent riots, thousands of others also turned out for counter-protests, denouncing the xenophobia and Islamophobia that had been incited and demonstrating a willingness to challenge the prejudices of extremist ideologies. By addressing the roots of right-wing extremism through policy reform, it’s more than possible for the UK to work toward a future that is safer for all. References Why are there riots in the UK? Arrests and charges related to violent disorder continue Only prosecute children over riots as last resort, says youth justice chair Southport attack misinformation fuels far-right discourse on social media   UK riots: Sir Keir Starmer makes 'guarantee' for 'thugs' and announces 'emergency security' for mosques Hate crime, England and Wales, year ending March 2024 How the United Kingdom voted on Thursday… and why Why should we Vote Leave on 23 June? Are there 4,000 foreign murderers and rapists living freely in the UK? Jo Cox killed in 'brutal, cowardly' and politically motivated murder, trial hears Former counter-terror chief accuses Farage of inciting Southport violence Elon Musk calls PM ‘two-tier Keir’ over police response to UK riots Twitter Is a Far-Right Social Network Musk's X helps Tommy Robinson rack up 434 million views during UK riots Stop and Search - By ethnicity   UK: Shawcross review of Prevent is 'deeply prejudiced and has no legitimacy'

Millie Gould It is no secret that Donald Trump has some controversial and downright conspiratorial views on climate change, with him even going as far as to call climate change “one of the greatest scams of all time” . Despite there being a consensus amongst 97% of climate scientists  that climate change is not only real but anthropogenically caused, Trump’s recent re-election for a second term signifies the return of climate denialism to the Oval Office.    As this article is published, the Climate Clock states that we have less than 4 years and 250 days to limit global warming to 1.5°C  and avoid irreversible damage to the planet we share. This means that these crucial years of climate action will be dominated by Trump’s anti-climate agenda, as he leads one of the most economically and politically powerful countries, and as a result the rest of the globe, sleepwalking further into the depths of climate crisis.  The discourse surrounding the recent US presidential election has been dominated by discussions regarding immigration policy and abortion bans, whilst environmental issues have been severely side-lined. Yet, if Trump’s environmental policy during his previous term in the White House is anything to go by, climate change should be front and centre as we enter the latter half of the ‘make-or-break’ decade  for our natural environment. Apart from his consistent anti-climate rhetoric, and vocal support for the fossil fuel industry, Trump was responsible for significant environmental policy rollback whilst in office between 2017 to 2021. More than 100 pieces of environmental regulations  and policies were rolled back, repealed or weakened under the previous Trump administration, leading to substantial legal challenges from environmental advocacy groups and organisations. Arguably the  most infamous of these changes, of course, was his withdrawal of the US from the Paris Agreement .  One of Joe Biden’s first acts as President in 2021 was to reinstate the US’s membership of the Paris Climate Accord , along with the revision and strengthening of the National Environmental Policy Act . This signified a decisively pro-environmental shift from the attitudes of the previous administration. Whilst the Biden administration was not without criticism, with the US remaining rated as Insufficient on the Climate Action Tracker , the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 contributed to and enabled record-breaking growth in clean energy . However, it appears likely that much of this momentum and progress will be short-lived. The Trump administration has already pledged the rapid reversal of Biden’s key climate policies , as most of these were achieved through executive authority which can be rescinded. To make matters worse, president-elect Trump has previously claimed he has every intention to pull out of the Paris Agreement for a second time , despite the increasing occurrences of climate disasters around the globe intensifying the need for climate finance. Such an act would “ cripple” the agreement , according to the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, potentially also encouraging other countries to follow suit. Furthermore, such potential could discourage other wealthy countries from contributing to the global fund for climate aid during the COP29 negotiations currently occurring within Azerbaijan , despite a Biden Administration delegate being in attendance. Climate scientists  have argued that a second term of Trump in office will likely mean maintaining temperatures at less than 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels will be unachievable. It is not just scientists who are rallying together against Trump’s reckless approach to climate governance - even Darren Woods, the CEO of Exxon Mobil , the USA’s largest oil and gas company, has publicly urged Trump not to pull out of the Paris Agreement for a second time.  Despite widespread warnings, it is improbable that climate action will be championed substantially at all within the US federal government under Trump unless there is significant resistance from within his own party. This is due to the Republican Party having gained a ‘governing trifecta’ , in which the president's party also has control over both the House of Representatives and the Senate. Such a situation sets a dismal tone for the latter half of this crucial decade. If the US does not lead by example, as the world’s most dominant economic power, it is unlikely that other countries will be willing to raise the stakes with their own ambitious climate action agendas.   That being said, all hope is not lost. Despite Trump having vowed to reverse much of the climate change policy implemented under the Biden administration, it is unlikely that this progress will be completely undermined. For example, the IRA has sent a clear signal to the market that further long-term decarbonisation efforts are to come as America continues to build a low-carbon economy. Similarly, subnational actions such as cities, states and businesses may be emboldened to take on leading roles in the fight against climate change, as they did under the first Trump administration through campaigns such as the America Is All In pledge . These initiatives have only become stronger since 2017 , demonstrating the powerful movement towards clean energy from bottom-up leadership organisations.  Thus, whilst the climate agenda may have to fight an uphill battle within the US under Trump’s second term, there is significant momentum and grass-roots public support indicating that clean energy will continue to grow rapidly. Sub-national organisations have a unique opportunity to demonstrate just how much support there is for the US to take the lead in climate action, even if the Trump administration is not on board.